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Rabee Securities Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) market report (week ending: 16th Aug 2018).

Note: ISX will be closed starting from Aug. 21, 2018 to Aug. 26, 2018 due to the religious holiday of Eid Al-Adha. The next session will be held on Monday, Aug. 27, 2018.

Please click here to download a table of listed companies and their associated ticker codes.

The RSISX index ended the week at IQD729 (.1.9%) / $779 (-2.3%) (weekly change) (-10.1% and -6.8% YTD change, respectively). The number of week traded shares was 22.1bn and the weekly trading volume was IQD8.9bn ($7.4 mn).

ISX Company Announcements

  • Chairman of Iraqi Securities Commission (ISC), Abdul Razzaq Al-Saadi, said during an interview with newspaper Al Sabah that the obstacles of the work of the Commission is the absence of a modern law that suits the international laws, so the Commission has worked to prepare a law for it, and has completed 85% of it. He stated that within six months the law will be completed and sent to the House of Representatives. He pointed out that this law allows the development of work and the adoption of new systems, most importantly corporate governance, which are the most important pillars to attract foreign investors. (ISC)
  • The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has been awarded the ISO 9001: 2015 certification in the Quality Management System (LMS Certification) by the British LMS Certification. (CBI)
  • Al-Zawraa for Financial Investment (VZAF) will hold an AGM* on Sep. 25, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of VZAF starting Sep. 20, 2018.
  • Bank of Baghdad (BBOB) will hold an AGM* on Sep. 17, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of BBOB starting Sep. 11, 2018.
  • Al -Hilal Industries (IHLI) will hold an AGM* on Sep. 9, 2018 to discuss and approve 2016 annual financial results. The company has been suspended from trading since Jul. 4, 2018 by an ISC decision.
  • Modern Chemical Industries (IMCI) will hold an AGM* on Aug. 31, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of IMCI starting Aug. 28, 2018.
  • Region Trade Bank for Investment and Finance (BTRB) will hold an AGM* on Aug. 29, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of BTRB starting Aug. 20, 2018.
  • Iraqi Engineering Works (IIEW) will resume trading on Aug. 19, 2018 because the company fulfilled ISX request to disclose its 2017 annual financial results.
  • Al-Khair Finacial Inv. (VKHF) will hold an AGM* on Aug. 28 to discuss and approve 2015 and 2016 annual financial results and to elect five new original and alternative BoDs. The company has been suspended since Jul. 6, 2017 by an ISC decision.
  • Modern Sewing (IMOS) resumed trading on Aug. 13, 2018 after discussing and approving 2017 annual financial results and to distribute 15% cash dividend (IQD0.15 dividend per share, 3.2% dividend yield).
  • ISX announced that Trust International Islamic Bank (BTRU), having a capital of IQD250 bn paid-in capital, has completed the listing procedures. BTRU started trading in the non-regular market starting Aug. 12, 2018.
  • Cross Transactions: 18.7 bn shares of Al-Noor for Money Transfer Co. (MTNN) on Aug. 15, 2018, which represents 41.6% of MTNN capital.

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Rabee Securities Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) market report (week ending: 9th Aug 2018).

Please click here to download a table of listed companies and their associated ticker codes.

The RSISX index ended the week at IQD743 (-1.0%) / $797 (-1.0%) (weekly change) (-8.4% and -4.6% YTD change, respectively). The number of week traded shares was 36.7bn and the weekly trading volume was IQD11.8bn ($9.7 mn).

ISX Company Announcements

  • National company for Tourism Investment (HNTI) will hold an AGM* on Sep. 2, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of HNTI starting Aug. 28, 2018.
  • ISX announced that Trust International Islamic Bank (BTRU), having a capital of IQD250bn paid-in capital, has completed the listing procedures. BTRU will start trading in the non-regular market starting Aug. 12, 2018. The opening price will be free for the first three sessions and then will have +/-20% price change limit.
  • Iraqi Land Transport Company (SILT) announced that the resumption of trucks’ transportation with Jordan will be resumed soon. Agreement was signed for the entry of the trucks of both countries. (Iraq Trade Link)
  • Al -Khazer for Construction Materials (IKHC) replied ISX request on Aug. 9, 2018 explaining their inability to provide 2017 annual financial reports due to the occupation of ISIS over the company. They also mentioned that the company’s production has stopped due to the damage of most of its equipment.
  • Ashur International Bank (BASH) resumed trading on Aug. 8, 2018 after discussing and approving 2017 annual financial results and to distribute 1% cash dividend (IQD0.01 dividend per share, 3.3% dividend yield).
  • Gulf Commercial Bank (BGUC) announced that the CBI approved the assignment of Adil Nuri Al-Alim as the new CEO of BGUC on Jul. 25, 2018.
  • The following companies were suspended from trading on Aug. 8, 2018 for not disclosing their 2017 annual financial results: AMAP, BBAY, BDFD, BDSI, BIME, BLAD, BNOR, BQAB, BROI, BUOI, HASH, HBAG, HBAY, HISH, HPAL, HTVM, IELI, IHFI, IHLI, IICM, IIEW, IKHC, IKLV, IMCM, IMIB, IMPI, INCP, ITLI, SBAG, SIGT, SILT, SMOF and VKHF.
  • International Islamic Bank (BINT) resumed trading on Aug. 6, after discussing and approving 2017 annual financial results and to distribute 1.54% cash dividend (IQD0.0154 dividend per share, 1.5% dividend yield).
  • Cross Transactions: 16 bn shares of Mosul Bank (BMFI) on Aug. 5, 2018, which represents 6.3% of BMFI capital. 13.5 bn shares of Al-Noor for Money Transfer Co. (MTNN) on Aug. 7, 2018, which represents 29.9% of MTNN capital. 255 mn shares of Cihan Bank for Islamic & Finance (BCIH) on Aug. 8, 2018, which represents 0.1% of BCIH capital.

By Ahmed Tabaqchali, CIO of Asia Frontier Capital (AFC) Iraq Fund.

Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

The market, as measured by the RSISUSD index, marked an important bottom in July as part of a likely bottoming process. The multi-month bank selling shifted into high gear. This intensified into a frenzy, climaxing by the middle of the month with the liquidation of a large foreign position in the Bank of Baghdad (BBOB) – one of the top banks on the Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX). At the worst point in July, BBOB and the index were down -24% and -12% respectively for the month, after which both reclaimed these losses to end up +2.4% and +0.5%.

The selling in the banking sector over the last few months, driven by concerns over declining FX margins (as explained here in the past), was paced by consistent foreign selling in BBOB. The size of the selling exaggerated the stock’s declines which had a knock-on effect on other banks which declined in-tandem and dragged the market with them given the sector’s dominance of trading on the ISX.

Local retail trading is dominated by speculators, yet locals tend to appreciate the true values of local assets especially at extreme valuations. At the worst point, BBOB’s market capitalization was equal to about 0.3x Book Value, 8.5% of assets and 15% of cash (based on the trailing 12 months) which would suggest that the stock was discounting some sort of end of the world type event. The locals, aware that such a catastrophe was not around the corner and that the decline was a function of a portfolio liquidation, raised funds from family, friends and banks in order to buy BBOB. Joined by a few foreign investors, undoubtedly aware of the same valuations, the combination absorbed all the significant selling, after which the stock began to climb.

Irrespective of BBOB’s strong position among local banks, it too suffered from the same forces that crushed the sector’s earnings, as discussed in last month review of banks (Of Banks and Budget Surpluses). Furthermore, it had its share of company specific issues and structural weaknesses that were exposed by the pains of 2014-2017, including the recent pressure on FX margins. The bank’s focus on addressing these weaknesses at the expense of revenue growth is hindering near term growth. However, given the quality of its management, strong position with high quality customers (in particular foreign companies) and the strength of its franchise, it should emerge in a position to resume growth in the recovering economy.

As explained last month, the banks’ leverage to the economy crushed their earnings. In particular, the double whammy of the ISIS conflict and the collapse in oil prices squeezed government finances as expenses soared while revenues plummeted. The government resorted to dramatic cuts to expenditures by cancelling capital spending and investments which, due to the centrality of its role in the economy, led to year-year declines in non-oil GDP of -3.9%, -9.6% and -8.1% for 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively. Ultimately, the government had a cumulative deficit of around USD 41bn during this period and accumulated significant arrears to the private sector in the process.

The same leverage should work in reverse as the expected budget surpluses of USD 28.5bn for 2017-2019 should have simulative effects on economic activity which ultimately should translate to stronger future earnings for the banks. These were discussed in further details at: “Forget the Donations, Stupid.”

For BBOB, the changes for the worse during the years of conflict can be seen through the three charts below that look at loans/non-performing loans (NPL’s), deposits and trade finance and their association with budget surpluses/deficits. BBOB Data as supplied by the research team at Rabee Securities is gratefully acknowledged. Data from 2010-2014 are based on Iraqi accounting standards, while data from 2015-2017 are based on IFRS.

BBOB’s loan book growth peaked in 2015, while NPL’s grew at the height of the crisis in 2016. The sharp decline in the loan book since then exaggerated the growth of NPL’s as a percentage of loans, as NPL’s declined in absolute terms marginally in 2017 vs. 2016.

Bank of Baghdad: Loans, NPL’s & Loan provisions 2011-2017

(Source: Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), Rabee Research, Asia Frontier Capital (AFC))

Though NPL’s are relatively high, even during the relative boom times, loans as a percentage of deposits have been very low at the mid-20%’s level as can be seen below.  Moreover, most of these loans are collagenized by property as most banks’ loans are in Iraq where the norm is for collateral value at 2x the loan. BBOB’s relatively large NPL’s were a function of the relative size of their loan book which meant a larger exposure to riskier loans taken during the boom years.

Bank of Baghdad: Deposits and Loan/Deposit ratio 2011-2017

(Source: Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), Rabee Research, Asia Frontier Capital (AFC))

The decline in deposits as a function of the economic contraction was made worse by the decline in BBOB’s trade finance business as that meant the loss of funds deposited as partial collateral required for the provisioning of trade finance.

Trade finance, once an engine of growth for the bank suffered as a result of the sharp economic contraction brought about by investment cuts and the slowdown in consumer spending.

Bank of Baghdad: Trade Finance 2011-2017

(Source: Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), Rabee Research, Asia Frontier Capital (AFC))

It’s logical to conclude that the sea change which has taken place in the government’s financial health would reverse the trends that affected the sector’s earnings as the significant stimulus to non-oil GDP should lead to sustainable economic activity which would provide BBOB room to recover, address its weaknesses and grow.

The question- when will these budget surpluses find their way into the economy through government action- has been partly answered by the government’s response to nationwide protests that erupted in early July, demanding the provision of services. The first response was to allocate USD 3bn to the city of Basra to fund long delayed infrastructure projects, a USD 669mn injection into the country’s housing fund to provide about 25,000 housing loans, plus a number of smaller projects in the southern governorates.

The eruption of protests in the city of Basra and their spread across the southern governorates right to Baghdad has, as is the usual case in all Iraqi events, led to two polar views. The first dismisses these as the usual ritual of summer protests ignited by the scorching heat that would soon settle with a few government handouts and the end of summer – echoing perhaps an old Iraqi politician who likened Iraqis’ anger to effervescent salts that erupt with a great fanfare before settling down. The second warns of the emergence of instability given that the Iraqi political establishment is incredibly slow to change its bad old habits, if at all, but that the young angry population is running out of patience.

While both arguments have merit, current protests should be seen from a wider prism in that they are the fourth instalment of a protest movement that began in 2010 and developed in both scope and maturity. The last incarnation in 2015 had a profound effect on how the election was fought and its ensuring results, as it led to the break-up of the ethno-sectarian monolithic blocs that were dominant over the past 15 years and which were at the root of Iraq’s instability. Thoughts supporting this line of thinking appear in (The Protest Movement, the Politicians and the Elections).

The influential religious leadership has supported the protest movement calling for the quick formation of a government focused on meeting the demands of demonstrators. This should hasten the formation of the government ending the current uncertainty. However, irrespective of how it is formed, the government would have the financial wherewithal to start the reconstruction of the country and the provisioning of infrastructure in the form of cumulative two-year budget surplus of USD 18.8bn by end of 2018- equal to a stimulus of 14.5% of non-oil GDP once reconstruction projects are underway. These would be enhanced by potential budget surplus of USD 9.3bn in 2019 or a further 6.8% stimulus to non-oil GDP. (Details available in a recent article).

It worth noting that while Iraq has its share of challenges, none are unsolvable in that the key issue of the last few years has been a sequence of crises that have forced successive governments into short -term solutions without providing overall long-term solutions. For instance, the current demonstrations were started by anger over the lack of electricity coverage beyond a few hours each day. Yet, “of 26 gigawatts installed generation, theoretically enough to meet the current 23 GW of demand, less than 17 GW is operable because of lack of fuel, maintenance and transmission capacity: source.” As such, these are addressable in a reasonable timeframe by a focused government with a clear mandate which could emerge given the current pressures from the electorate supported by the religious authority.

Finally a report on Iraq’s debts addresses a number of misconceptions on its debt profile that would have a huge implication for its ability to fund the needed reconstruction and the provisioning of services is here (Understanding Iraq’s Debt).

Please click here to download Ahmed Tabaqchali’s full report in pdf format.

Mr Tabaqchali (@AMTabaqchali) is the CIO of the AFC Iraq Fund, and is an experienced capital markets professional with over 25 years’ experience in US and MENA markets. He is a non-resident Fellow at the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS) at the American University of Iraq-Sulaimani (AUIS). He is a board member of the Credit Bank of Iraq.

His comments, opinions and analyses are personal views and are intended to be for informational purposes and general interest only and should not be construed as individual investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell or hold any fund or security or to adopt any investment strategy. It does not constitute legal or tax or investment advice. The information provided in this material is compiled from sources that are believed to be reliable, but no guarantee is made of its correctness, is rendered as at publication date and may change without notice and it is not intended as a complete analysis of every material fact regarding Iraq, the region, market or investment.

 

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Rabee Securities Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) market report (week ending: 2nd Aug 2018).

Please click here to download a table of listed companies and their associated ticker codes.

The RSISX index ended the week at IQD751 (-5.1%) / $806 (-5.1%) (weekly change) (-7.4% and -3.6% YTD change, respectively). The number of week traded shares was 6.4 bn and the weekly trading volume was IQD5.5bn ($4.9 mn).

ISX Company Announcements

  • The CBI participated in the opening of the representative office of the International Development Bank (BIDB) in Dubai. The opening ceremony, attended by Iraqi and foreign economic and financial figures, underscored the need for the Iraqi private banks to play a role in the development of the Iraqi economy and the development of banking. (CBI)
  • The Governor of the CBI, Ali Mohsen Ismail, accompanied by a number of general managers, made a field visit to private banks for two days. This visit came within the series of visits by the Governor to find out the obstacles facing banks, and work to remove them. (CBI)
  • AL Arabiya Islamic Bank (BAAI) will hold an AGM* on Aug. 16, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of BAAI starting Aug. 12, 2018.
  • Sumer Commercial Bank (BSUC) will hold an AGM* on Aug. 12, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of BSUC starting Aug. 7, 2018.
  • Dar Al-Salam for Insurance (NDSA) will resume trading on Aug. 5, 2018 after discussing and approving 2017 annual financial results as well as disclosing its 3M18 financial results.
  • National Bank of Iraq (BNOI) resumed trading on Aug. 2, 2018 after discussing and approving 2017 annual financial results and distributing 8% cash dividend (IQD0.08 dividend per share, 19.5% dividend yield).
  • Original shares of AL-Sadeer Hotel (HSAD) resumed trading on Aug. 2, 2018 after discussing and approving 2014, 2015 and 2016 annual financial results and deciding to increase its capital from IQD1.239 bn to IQD1.735 bn through 40% rights issue.
  • Al-Mansour Pharmaceuticals Industries (IMAP) resumed trading on Jul. 30, 2018 after discussing and approving 2016 and 2017 annual financial results and deciding to distribute 6% cash dividend (IQD0.06 dividend per share, 8.7% dividend yield).
  • Iraqi for Tufted Carpets (IITC) resumed trading on Jul. 30, 2018 after discussing and approving 2017 annual financial results and deciding to distribute 50% cash dividend (IQD0.50 dividend per share, 6.5% dividend yield).
  • Cross Transactions: 255 mn shares of Cihan Bank for Islamic & Finance (BCIH) on Aug. 2, 2018, which represents 0.1% of BCIH capital.

 

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Rabee Securities Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) market report (week ending: 26th July 2018).

Please click here to download a table of listed companies and their associated ticker codes.

The RSISX index ended the week at IQD792 (+15.1%) / $849 (+15.1%) (weekly change) (-2.4% and -1.6% YTD change, respectively). The number of week traded shares was 28.6 bn and the weekly trading volume was IQD9.5bn ($7.9 mn).

ISX Company Announcements

  • Al-Hamraa for Insurance (NHAM) will hold an AGM* on Sept. 10, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of NHAM starting Sept. 5, 2018.
  • Modern Sewing (IMOS) will hold an AGM* on Aug. 8, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of IMOS starting Aug. 5, 2018.
  • Ashur International Bank for Investment (BASH) will hold an AGM* on Jul. 31, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX suspended trading of BASH starting Jul. 26, 2018.
  • International Development Bank for Investment (BIDB) resumed trading on Jul. 25, 2018 after discussing and approving 2017 annual financial results and deciding to distribute 5.2% cash dividend (IQD0.052 dividend per share, 6.0% dividend yield).
  • Al-Ameen for Insurance (NAME) resumed trading on Jul. 25, 2018 after discussing and approving 2017 annual financial results.
  • Iraq Noor Islamic Bank for Investment (BINI) resumed trading on Jul. 24, 2018 after discussing and approving 2017 annual financial results and deciding to distribute 2.4% cash dividend (IQD0.024 dividend per share, 2.4% dividend yield).
  • AL-Sadeer Hotel (HSAD) will hold its AGM* on Jul. 29, 2018 to discuss and approve 2014, 2015 and 2016 annual financial results and increase the capital from IQD1.239 bn to IQD1.362 bn through 10% rights issue. ISX suspended trading of HSAD starting Jul. 24, 2018.
  • Kurdistan International Bank (BKUI) disclosed the current ownership percentages of Bahra Muhammed Yassin and Khan Adil Disco as 8.27% and 8.89%, respectively.
  • International Islamic Bank (BINT) postponed its AGM* from Jul. 24, 2018 to Jul. 31, 2018 due to the absence of some BoD members.
  • Al Janoob Islamic Bank for Investment and Finance (BJAB) started trading on Jul. 22, 2018 after 21 days of depositing the company’s shares. The company’s share price will be free only for the first three sessions.
  • Cross Transactions: 12 bn shares of Mosul Bank (BMFI) on Jul. 24, 2018, which represents 4.75% of BMFI capital. 510 mn shares of Cihan Bank for Islamic & Finance (BCIH) on Jul. 22 and  Jul. 26, 2018, which represent 0.2% of BCIH capital.

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Rabee Securities Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) market report (week ending: 12th July 2018).

Please click here to download a table of listed companies and their associated ticker codes.

The RSISX index ended the week at IQD731 (-0.3%) / $784 (-0.3%) (weekly change) (-9.9% and -6.2% YTD change, respectively). The number of week traded shares was 4.9 bn and the weekly trading volume was IQD5.0bn ($4.2 mn).

ISX Company Announcements

  • The CBI signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with UnionPay International Company to contribute to the development of intelligent payment technologies and electronic payment services in Iraq. UnionPay is one of the largest companies in China and most Asian countries in this field, in addition to being the third largest international company to issue and collect cards. The CBI notes that this is the third memorandum signed by the bank in 2018 with international card companies as part of its plans to expand the use of high technology to promote card work and develop payment systems in accordance with international best practice. (CBI)
  • UK-based ONEm is partnering with Asiacell (TASC) to bring unlimited news and entertainment content from Reuters to Iraq. Asiacell subscribers can now exclusively access global news on any mobile device for 600 IQD per week. The Reuters service provides full coverage of real time news and entertainment content in Arabic delivered by SMS. (Iraq Business News)
  • Al_Rabita Al_Maliya Co (MTRA) will hold a joint GA with (Bilad Al-Sham for Money Transfer and Al-Shariq for Money Transfer) on Jul. 26, 2018 to discuss merging these three companies and deciding to change the company from a Money Transfer company into an Islamic Bank according to CBI’s approval.
  • Iraqi for Tufted Carpets (IITC) will hold an AGM* on Jul. 25, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of IITC starting Jul. 22, 2018.
  • National Bank of Iraq (BNOI) will hold an AGM* on Jul. 23, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of BNOI starting Jul. 18, 2018.
  • International Development Bank for Investment (BIDB) will hold an AGM* on Jul. 18, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of BIDB starting Jul. 15, 2018.
  • Iraqi Middle East Bank (BIME) completed their legal amendment of article (six) on Jul. 3, 2018 to decrease the number of BoDs from 7 members to 5 original members and other 5 alternative members.
  • Cross Transactions: 510 mn shares of Cihan Bank for Islamic & Finance (BCIH) on Jul. 8 and Jul. 11, 2018, which represent 0.2% of BCIH capital.

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Rabee Securities Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) market report (week ending: 5th July 2018).

Please click here to download a table of listed companies and their associated ticker codes.

The RSISX index ended the week at IQD733 (-5.3%) / $786 (-5.3%) (weekly change) (-9.6% and -5.9% YTD change, respectively). The number of week traded shares was 5.9 bn and the weekly trading volume was IQD12.9bn ($10.6 mn).

ISX Company Announcements

  • The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) officially announced Iraq’s exit from the follow-up area, as the CBI and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) / Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) have made significant progress in improving and addressing deficiencies and meeting all its obligations towards FATF recommendations. (CBI.iq)
  • The ISX moved trading of 16 companies from the regular market to the non-regular market starting Jul. 5, 2018 due to the following reasons: 1) Due to the decrease in annual trading volume: BROI, TZNI, VWIF, NAHF, 2) Due to not trading in 2017: BEFI, 3) Due to the decrease in all indicators: NDSA, VZAF, 4) Due to being under CBI custody: BDFD, BDSI, BLAD, 5) Due to not submitting the annual reports of 2014-16: BUOI, SIGT, IKHC, ITLI, IMPI, and IFCM.
  • Al-Sadeer Hotel (HSAD) will hold an AGM* on Jul. 29, 2018 to discuss and approve 2014 and 2016 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of HSAD starting Jul .24, 2018.
  • International Islamic Bank (BINT) will hold an AGM* on Jul. 24, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of BINT starting Jul. 19, 2018.
  • Iraq Noor Islamic Bank for Investment (BINI) will hold an AGM* on Jul. 17, 2018 to discuss and approve 2017 annual financial results. ISX will suspend trading of BINI starting Jul. 12, 2018.
  • New shares of Al-Mosul for Funfair (SMOF) from the capital increase from IQD400mn to IQD800mn through 100% bonus issue resumed trading on Jul. 4, 2018.
  • The following companies were suspended from trading starting Jul. 4, 2018 for not disclosing their 1Q18 financial results: INCP, IHLI, NDSA, MTMA, HBAG, HISH, IICM, ITLI, IMPI, IEAB, SILT, SIGT, SBAG, VKHF, IKHC, IFCM, IMCM, and IHFI.
  • Mamoura Real-estate Investment (SMRI) and AL-Nukhba for General Construction (SNUC) resumed trading on Jul. 1, 2018 after discussing and approving 2017 annual financial results.
  • Cross Transactions: 864 mn shares of Asiacell (TASC) on Jul. 2, 2018, which represents 0.28% of TASC capital.

By Ahmed Tabaqchali, CIO of Asia Frontier Capital (AFC) Iraq Fund.

Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Activity in the economy at large, and the market in particular, came to a virtual standstill at the start of the month as it coincided with last two weeks of Ramadan which ended with the Eid holiday’s in the middle of June.

The start of the summer heat in earnest further contributed to the slowdown of activity. However, the intense focus on the political activity around the election results took the spotlight over the major markers of economic recovery and the banks’ leverage to it.

Average minimum and maximum temperatures in Baghdad in degrees centigrade

(Source: World weather and climate Information)

The elections produced winners and losers who will eventually form a coalition government as reported last month, a process that should take a few weeks but could extend to a few months. Claims of fraud surfaced as in past elections, however this time there was an unusual action by parliament to force a manual recount of the whole vote and a wholesale annulment of certain types of votes (overseas, IDP’s and security forces votes). The parliament’s action was made possible by investigations that suggested that fraud was made possible by hacking the electronic readers of the ballot papers –introduced for the first time this year.

The potential disruption could have resulted in a delayed government formation until early 2019. However, objections to parliament’s action were raised to the Supreme Federal Court, whose ruling on 21st June was a master class response to the conflicting political reactions following the elections. The ruling, provided a framework for a workable compromise as evidenced by its wholesale acceptance by all of Iraq’s political parties.

The ruling is discussed in a recent article: in a nutshell it led to a manual recount of only of those election centres whose results were disputed, and thus should be concluded in a few weeks. The impact will likely be felt in a changed balance of power among the Kurdish parties and among some Sunni parties, but ultimately will not significantly change the balance of power of the main election winners. The process of government formation continued unabated during this period and the broad outlines of it are taking shape.

However, irrespective of how the upcoming government is formed, it would need to address the issues at the heart of the 2015 protest movement that had such a profound effect on how the election was fought and its results. These would be the provision of services and reconstruction, which require much needed overdue investments in the country’s infrastructure and the reconstruction of the liberated areas, estimated at USD 88bn over five years.

Prevailing negative perceptions of Iraq’s ability to fund this have not reflected the transformative effects of higher oil prices and the end of conflict on Iraq’s ability to self-fund the reconstruction of the whole country. These were discussed in detail in a recent article, the highlights of which are: By end of 2018, based on realized oil prices of 2017 and average year-to-date for 2018, Iraq is on its way to have a cumulative two-year budget surplus of USD 18.8bn instead of the initially projected cumulative deficit of USD 19.4bn. This would be equal to a stimulus of 14.5% of non-oil GDP once reconstruction projects are underway, thus further accelerating economic activity. The effects of this stimulus would be enhanced by a potential budget surplus of USD 9.3bn in 2019 or a further 6.8% stimulus to non-oil GDP.

The stock market’s action in June was a continuation of the same trends discussed here over the last few months. By end of June, the market, as measured by the Rabee Securities’ RSISUSD Index, was down -3.5%, bringing its year to date performance to -0.6. Average daily turnover was among the lowest of the last three years and most stocks, in particular the banks continued to decline.

The market’s focus continues to be the effects of the shrinking FX margins on banks’ earnings brought on, paradoxically, by the increasing signs of an improvement in liquidity in the broader economy. These were brought by the steady increases in the market price of the Iraqi Dinar (IQD) versus the USD, lowering its premium over the official exchange rate to 1.2% – the lowest point in a number of years from just under 6% at the end of 2017 and 10% at the end of 2016. FX spreads are one of many sources of revenues for the higher quality banks but constitute the bulk of earnings for the lower quality banks. However, almost all banks were caught in the group’s sell-off which accelerated in recent months.

However, valid as these concerns are, they fail to take into account the transformative effects of the expected budget surpluses of USD 28.5bn for 2017-2019 on the banks’ future earnings through the simulative effects the surpluses would have on economic activity. This same leverage worked in reverse during the double whammy of the ISIS conflict and the collapse in oil prices as government finances were crushed by soaring expenses and plummeting revenues.

The government resorted to dramatic cuts to expenditures by cancelling capital spending and investments which, due to the centrality of its role in the economy, led to year-year declines in non-oil GDP of -3.9%, -9.6% and -8.1% for 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively. Ultimately, the government had a cumulative deficit of around USD 41bn during this period and accumulated significant arrears to the private sector in the process. The outstanding arrears are estimated by the IMF to be at USD 3.6bn as the end of 2017.

The effects were disastrous for private sector businesses at the receiving end of the cuts whose finances deteriorated, and which in turn affected the quality of bank loans as these businesses accounted for the bulk of bank lending.  As a result, the banks’ earning suffered from the increasing non-performing loans (NPL’s) coupled with negative loan growth, as well as from declining/negative deposit growth.

The changes for the worse for the banks during these years can be seen through the three charts below that look at loans/NPL’s, deposits and trade finance and their association with budget surpluses/deficits. The charts consider only loans/NPL’s, deposits and trade finance for the private sector but not those for the government as they conducted through state banks.

Loans and NPL’s 2010-2017

(Source: Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), Asia Frontier Capital (AFC))

Loan growth peaked in 2015 after slowing in the prior year and has declined since, while NPL’s soared in 2015-2016 as the effects of the capital spending cuts fed through to deteriorating loan quality. These negative effects were made worse by a flight to safety as more of the private sector borrowed from state banks instead, in the process increasing their share from 59% to 63% of all private sector lending. The ultimate effects of budget surpluses and deficits on loan growth and quality can also be seen from the above chart.

Deposits 2010-2017

(Source: Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), Asia Frontier Capital (AFC))

The same story is repeated with private sector deposits which for commercial banks peaked in 2013 and declined since then. The flight to quality was again evident in the slower decline in total deposit growth and its pick-up in 2017 as the expansionary effects of the recovery in oil prices and the ending of conflict were being felt. In the process, the state banks increased their share of total private sector deposits from 61% to 68%.

Trade Finance 2010-2017

(Source: Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), Asia Frontier Capital (AFC))

The only area where commercial banks increased their share was that of trade finance for the private sector- increasing from 71% to 87%. However, trade finance suffered significantly in this period as trade declined due to investment cuts and the slowdown in consumer spending. This further hurt the commercial banks as it was a major source of revenues and growth.

Its logical to conclude that the sea change which has taken place in the government’s financial health would reverse the trends seen in the charts above as the significant stimuluses to non-oil GDP should lead to sustainable economic activity, providing room for the banks to recover and grow again.

It should be noted that these are aggregate figures for the whole sector which hide significant variations in the performance of individual banks. The pains of 2014-2017, including the recent pressure on FX margins, would have exposed the structural weaknesses of many of the banks and will likely lead to failures among the weaker ones. However, the stronger banks that weathered the storm and addressed any structural weaknesses should benefit disproportionally from the expected benefits from a recovering economy.

Please click here to download Ahmed Tabaqchali’s full report in pdf format.

Mr Tabaqchali (@AMTabaqchali) is the CIO of the AFC Iraq Fund, and is an experienced capital markets professional with over 25 years’ experience in US and MENA markets. He is a non-resident Fellow at the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS) at the American University of Iraq-Sulaimani (AUIS). He is a board member of the Credit Bank of Iraq.

His comments, opinions and analyses are personal views and are intended to be for informational purposes and general interest only and should not be construed as individual investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell or hold any fund or security or to adopt any investment strategy. It does not constitute legal or tax or investment advice. The information provided in this material is compiled from sources that are believed to be reliable, but no guarantee is made of its correctness, is rendered as at publication date and may change without notice and it is not intended as a complete analysis of every material fact regarding Iraq, the region, market or investment.

By Ahmed Tabaqchali (pictured), CIO of Asia Frontier Capital (AFC) Iraq Fund.

This article was originally published in the Marsh to Mountain blog. Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

“Forget the Donations, Stupid”: New dynamics in funding the reconstruction of Iraq

Key Takeaways

In the months following the Kuwait Conference a sea change has taken place in Iraq’s financial health that has yet to be reflected in perceptions.

Higher oil prices, as a result of the changed dynamics of the oil market and the robust health of the global economy, has had a transformative effect on Iraq’s finances.

By end of 2018, based on realized oil prices of 2018 and average year-to-date for 2018, Iraq is on its way to have a cumulative two-year budget surplus of $18.8bn instead of the initially projected cumulative deficit of $19.4bn.  

This would allow it to start the reconstruction process on its own resources. Coupled with a potential surplus of $9.3bn in 2019 would give the country a great deal of flexibility to fund further reconstruction over the near-term. 

The surplus of $18.8bn by end of 2018 would equal a stimulus of 14.5% of non-oil GDP once reconstruction projects are underway, which would further accelerate economic activity. 

However, this three-year window of opportunity faces the twin headwinds of Iraq’s corrosive corruption and all of prior governments’ failures to spend oil wealth on  rebuilding the country’s infrastructure, spending it instead on expanding the state’s role in the economy.

——————————————————————-

A great deal has changed since the Kuwait Conference on the reconstruction of Iraq, which was marred by misconceptions of international observers who bemoaned that it failed to achieve its objective in raising enough donations. These were not helped by an Iraqi side that went to the conference looking for donations (investments in Iraqi speak) by focusing its efforts solely on presenting a shopping list of projects that needed $88bn in funding over five years.

These misconceptions were addressed in a prior article[1] which highlighted that over five years, Iraq should be able to fund $77bn out of this $88bn through a combination of $50bn from its oil revenues and $27bn in borrowings. Crucially, this level of direct funding and borrowing would be consistent with maintaining macroeconomic stability, which means that funding the reconstruction would not distract from the government fulfilling its traditional role in the economy, and so the reconstruction will contribute to sustainable economic growth.

This ability to fund the $77bn was derived from the IMF estimates for Iraq’s budget for 2018-2022 based on updated market-implied future Iraq oil prices, i.e. the implicit price of oil from the futures markets. In February, the implied price for Iraqi oil was $60/bbl for 2018, declining to $51 by 2022. These are in sharp contrast to the IMF’s estimates in August 2017 which used Iraqi oil prices of $45.5 in 2018, increasing to $47.2 by 2022. The 2018-2022 estimates made in 2017 would have made it impossible for Iraq to fund any portion of the needed funding as it would have needed to borrow to balance its budget during these years[2].

Iraq’s high dependence[3] on oil means that its budget and GDP are highly sensitive to the volume of oil it exports and to oil prices. The massive change in oil prices over the last few years, as seen from the five-year Brent crude price chart below, played havoc with Iraq’s budget during the ISIS conflict 2014-2017. They forced the government into a sharp fiscal retrenchment by cutting costs and cancelling all investment spending, while increasing military spending which had substantial negative knock-on effects on the economy[4]. The significant effects of oil price changes extend to planning for funding the reconstruction directly by Iraq, and indirectly by its stakeholders who need to take into account these effects in relation to their level of contributions and expected investment returns.

Brent Crude Jun 2013-Jun 2018, Source: Financial Times[5]

The fundamentals of the oil market went through major changes over the last four years, from expectations of supply scarcity versus increasing demand up to mid-2014; fears of increasing supply overwhelming decreasing demand from mid-2014 into late-2016; easing somewhat to hopes for a rebalance by mid 2017; and finally, into growing demand exceeding declining supply. Overlay the robust health of the global economy and it is expected the oil market will continue to tighten in the immediate future. This outlook is complicated by disruptive technologies such as those behind the Shale oil boom in the US, and by geopolitics affecting major suppliers such as Iran and Venezuela. These are balanced somewhat by OPEC’s actions and shifting perceptions of either its increasing dominance or increasing irrelevance. These perceptions came into sharp focus with the OPEC & non-OPEC supply cut agreement in late 2016 that started the recovery process. Recently there is news that talks have been underway to increase supply as prices have risen too high in response to threats to Iranian and Venezuelan supplies.

These would make budget planning, let alone long-term reconstruction planning, for Iraq an exercise in folly if it were to use the latest market implied future prices or to accept the prevailing wisdom at any given time as a basis for planning. This pretty much explains the conservative assumptions used by the IMF -which the world financial community depends on in assessing Iraq’s financial soundness and its credit worthiness. These assumptions served as the basis on which Iraq and the IMF identified creditors and donors for Iraq to cover its estimated budget deficits for 2017-2022 as part of the IMF’s 2016 Standby agreement.  Moreover, the IMF updated these assumptions with new estimates for forward oil prices as part of its Kuwait Conference presentation.

A recent article[6] noted “using realized prices of Iraqi oil of $49.1/bbl for 2017, and assuming Iraqi oil prices of $60/bbl for 2018, then declining to $51/bbl in 2022, would produce a cumulative surplus of $47.4bn for 2017-2022 instead of the earlier assumed cumulative deficit of $17.6bn”[7].  While using higher estimates for oil prices would result in a cumulative surplus of $78.2bn. In the first scenario Iraq could fund the reconstruction by a combination of $50bn from its oil revenues and $27bn from borrowings, and the final $11bn from aid/donations, which is in-line with the assumptions made by the IMF at the Kuwait conference.  While, in the second scenario Iraq could fund the reconstruction by a combination of $80bn from its oil revenues and $8bn from borrowings which is a vastly different proposition.

Given the impossibility of forecasting future oil prices, especially up to 2022, this article will consider the data for 2017-2019 given the higher degree of predictability in this short timeframe.

The IMF updated its global growth projections to +3.9% for both 2018 & 2019, up from its previous projections of 3.7% for both which was made in late 2017 as part of its World Economic Outlook (WEO) in April[8]. It believes that the upswing that began in 2016 has accelerated since then but it expects that it will taper off afterword’s. These coupled with changed dynamics in the oil supply/demand imply higher oil price assumptions for the period, which for the short-term has positive implications for oil exporting nations in MENA as outlined in its Regional Economic Outlook (ROE) May[9].

For Iraq, these would have huge implications for its economic profile for 2017-2019 and thus to its ability to start funding the huge reconstruction demands. The table below looks at the original IMF estimates for Iraq’s budget 2017-2019[10] versus updated estimates for 2017-2019 based on the latest actual data for 2017 and updated estimates for oil prices.

For sources & assumptions see endnote[11]

The updated assumptions for 2017-2019 imply a cumulative surplus of $28.1bn vs earlier assumptions of a cumulative deficit of $22.8. Although Iraq has identified funding sources for each year during the budget planning stages, it is likely that it would have not utilized them due to the higher revenues as a result of the higher than planned oil prices. These unused funding sources could be as high as $14.3bn[12].

Irrespective of the above, the upcoming government should have a cumulative surplus of $18.8bn by the end of 2018 which can be used to start the reconstruction process, which coupled with the likely surplus of $9.3bn in 2019 would give the country a great deal of flexibility to fund further reconstruction over the near-term. This flexibility would be augmented by $30bn, over five years, in investments and trade credit guarantees that Iraq received during the Kuwait Conference in February[13].

The effect of this spending flexibility on economic activity is enormous, in that should the surpluses be spent on reconstruction from 2019 over a two-year period, this would be equivalent to an economic stimulus of 14.5%[14] of 2019’s non-oil GDP over this period. This is a major economic stimulus by any account that would be magnified over the next five-years should the $30bn in pledges that Iraq received materialize.

However, the risk, and the likelihood, is that the upcoming government would succumb to public pressures to use some of this extra fiscal flexibility on populist measures. Such pressures have already been applied by parliament as it amended the budget by removing the 3.8% tax on salaries and pensions to appease an angry electorate in an election year. The elections marked by the continued pro-reform demonstrations since 2015, and the large active non-participation movement imply that the upcoming government would increase spending on populist measures to pacify the electorate and provide a visible peace divided.  In fact, the updated estimates for 2018 & 2109 in the table above reflect the expectations of higher expenditures, which would narrow the surplus for these two years, which in turn would detract from the funds available for infrastructure investment.

A further risk is the country’s corrosive corruption which would find breathing space as a result of higher oil revenues, especially if they are spent on populist measures, in the process relieving public pressures on the government to reform and to expose corruption. Moreover, the practice post-2003 of using state contracts as a means of reinforcing political influence on selected players in the private sector could continue, further entrenching corruption, with the government ability to fund the reconstruction and ability to award contracts.

Even, if the government would not succumb to populist measures, it would still need to resort to borrowing to continue funding the reconstruction. This is especially true given the high level of government expenditures, especially its public-sector payroll and social security spending. Moreover, higher oil prices for 2017-2019 will likely lead to the government to slow the pace of fiscal consolidation in response to public demands. This therefore means that budget surpluses will decline in time, especially as oil prices are likely to moderate in the coming years[15].

Borrowing, especially from the commercial debt markets, imposes a much-needed discipline on the government to adhere to sound fiscal policy and to continue the path of reducing its role in the economy and encouraging the development of the private sector[16]. Combined with the IMF’s 2016 Stand-By Agreement (SBA) this should help ensure sustainable macroeconomic stability.

Iraq’s ability to assume debt that is sustainable and within the confines of maintaining macroeconomic stability is much higher than assumed by many who merely look at the headline figure. An upcoming report by the author looks into the composition and background of Iraq’s debt[17]. The IMF estimates the total debt to be $122.9bn by end of 2017[18], made up of external debt of $73.7bn and domestic debt of $49.2bn.

However, $41bn out the external debt is to non-Paris Club creditors, mostly the GCC nations, that date back to the pre-2003 regime which are under negotiations to reduce them on the same terms as applied by the Paris Club of creditors. Should this happen they would likely be reduced by 90% to $4.1bn[19]. Therefore, including the unused borrowing for the 2017 deficit, this means that actual debt by end of 2017 is more likely to be $71.7bn[20] than the headline figure of $122.9bn. This would imply debt/GDP ratios of 37.3% for 2017 and 32.1% for 2018[21], giving Iraq plenty of scope to assume debts of up to $40bn and still keep debt/GDP ratio under 50% for 2018[22].

A sea change in Iraq’s position has taken place since the months leading up to the Kuwait Conference, but perceptions have not. Iraq’s position was that of a country with a debt/GDP ratio of 63.8%/65.3% for 2017/18, that needs to borrow to fund its budget deficit for the next few years and thus needs aid/donations to fund an urgent and massive reconstruction. The sea change, based on the IMF’s May REO, is that Iraq now has a debt/GDP ratio of 58%/54.7% for 2017/18, a budget surplus and can start to fund its reconstruction. This article further shows that Iraq can start funding its reconstruction in 2018 with $18.8bn in cumulative surpluses based on current oil prices. If the argument above on the underlying nature of its debt were to unfold then Iraq can add to this by accessing $40bn in the debt markets- which is far more than its immediate needs for reconstruction.

The underlying positive for Iraq that is fortunately to a large extent free from any government planning, or mismanagement, is that the reconstruction along the lines described by the joint study of the World Bank Group (WBG) and Iraq’s Ministry of Planning (MoP), on its own, will generate substitutional non-oil economic activity[23]. This activity can over the course of the next five years provide the non-oil economy with sufficient momentum for Iraq to escape its high oil dependence, which no government has attempted before. The silver lining of the trauma caused by the ISIS conflict, coupled with collapsing oil prices was that Iraq, in spite of all the improbable odds, united and climbed its way out of the abyss and of total disintegration. Given Iraq’s ability to start self-funding the reconstruction, a similar silver lining is that the recovery from the same trauma, in the form of reconstruction, could lead the country’s evolution away from pure oil dependence.

Disclaimer

Ahmed Tabaqchali’s comments, opinions and analyses are personal views and are intended to be for informational purposes and general interest only and should not be construed as individual investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell or hold any fund or security or to adopt any investment strategy. It does not constitute legal or tax or investment advice. The information provided in this material is compiled from sources that are believed to be reliable, but no guarantee is made of its correctness, is rendered as at publication date and may change without notice and it is not intended as a complete analysis of every material fact regarding Iraq, the region, market or investment.

 

[1] http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2018/02/22/its-not-the-donations-stupid-key-points-from-kuwait-conf/ – _edn3

 

[2] IMF’s estimates and presentation in the Kuwait conference are at:  Session 3 after clicking on the pdf icon of the presentation. Presentation starts at minute 8.20 on the youtube link on the link below: –

https://view.publitas.com/1692ac51-faf7-464f-a9c2-1784ed1da647/iraq-reconstruction-and-investment-part-3-investment-opportunities-and-reforms/page/1

IMF’s earlier estimates are from Country Report No. 17/251

 

[3] 2017 estimates: Oil exports accounted for 99% of all exports, Oil revenues accounted for 87% of government revenues which in turn accounted for 32% of total GDP. Moreover, Oil GDP accounted for 38% of total GDP and indirectly accounts for the bulk on non-Oil GDP as the government’s orders drives non-Oil GDP (source: Country Report No. 17/251).

 

[4] A report by the author discusses this dynamic and the government response http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2017/07/17/economic-consequences-post-mosul/. Some highlights of which are “The government maintained overall spending on salaries and pensions, but it introduced new and increased existing consumption taxes on a large number of consumables while it also increased utility prices, Non-oil investments bore the brunt of the cuts as the government sharply curtailed all capital spending and investments.”

 

[5] https://markets.ft.com/data/commodities/tearsheet/summary?c=Brent+Crude+Oil

Iraqi oil sells for about $5/bbl discount to Brent.

 

[6] http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2018/05/23/market-review-elections-the-economy-and-the-stock-market/

 

[7] The deficit of $17.6bn was based on IMF estimates made in 2017 (Country Report No. 17/251). The IMF has since then updated its revenue estimates higher based on higher oil prices which imply a much lower cumulative deficit than the one used here, but these estimates were only up to 2019 and hence old estimates are still used. Updated data is at: World Economic Outlook April 2018 & Regional Economic Outlook May 2018 in the two footnotes below.

 

The estimates depend on IMF projections which assume that the government spending would continue to be constrained but this is unlikely given public demands for an ease as a result of higher oil prices. This will be balanced in this report’s higher oil price assumptions such that the surpluses would be the similar as will be seen later in this report and in the author’s other recent publications.

 

[8] https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2018/03/20/world-economic-outlook-april-2018

 

[9] http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2018/04/24/mreo0518 (data only until 2019)

 

[10] IMF Iraq Country Report No. 17/251 (http://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr17251.ashx). The IMF assumptions are used throughout for assumptions made in 2017, instead of available Iraq budget figures for 2017 & 2018, to ensure consistency with other estimates used throughout. Moreover, the data from the IMF country report 17/251 are used instead of the IMF updated data (footnotes above) as the updated figures provide only headline numbers without specific details that are needed for a full analysis.

Note: figures are rounded, and so total figures might not add up fully.

 

Below are the main differences between IMF projections and those of Iraq’s budgets for 2017 & 2018, and Iraq’s actual 2017 budget spending.

 

Iraq’s budget vs IMF projections for 2017

  • Iraq’s budget
    • Total revenues of $66.8bn made up of oil revenues of $57.5bn based on oil price of $42/bbl, and total exports of 3.75mbbl/d. These exports include the KRG’s exports of 0.55mbbl/d.
      • The agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was for it to export 0.55mbbl/d through Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). In return the KRG would receive 17%, less sovereign expenses, of the federal budget. However, neither have fulfilled their obligations, yet, both of Iraq’s budget and the IMF budget assumptions include the KRG’s oil exports and its share of expenditure.
    • Expenditures of $82.2bn, creating a deficit of $18.3bn.
  • IMF projections:
    • Total revenues of $69.2bn made up from oil revenues of $61.3bn based on oil price of $45.3/bbl and total exports 3.8mbbl/d, and non-oil revenues of $7.5bn
    • Expenditures of $79bn, creating a deficit of $9.8bn

 

Iraq’s preliminary budget vs IMF projections for 2018

  • Iraq’s budget
    • Total revenues of $77.5bn made up from oil revenues of $65.2bn based on oil price of $46/bbl, and total exports of 3.888mbbl/d. These exports include the KRG’s exports of 0.55mbbl/d.
    • Expenditures of $88.1bn creating a deficit of $10.6bn
  • IMF Projections
    • Total revenues of $73.9bn made up from oil revenues of $64.3bn based on oil price of $45.5/bbl, and total exports 3.9mbbl/d and non-oil revenues of $9.3bn
    • Expenditures of $83.4bn creating a deficit of $9.5bn

 

Iraq’s actual 2017 budget revenues and expenditures based on Ministry of Finance (MoF) data

  • Oil revenues of $55.3bn, which exclude the revenues from the KRG’s direct exports of 0.55mbbl/d (included in the IMF projections in the table used and in Iraq’s budget planning). These revenues would have been higher than planned by the government which assumed an oil price of $42/bbl total, including KRG, exports of 3.75mbbl/d vs the realized price estimated at $49.2. They are also higher than the IMF est.’s which assumed a $45.5/bbl on total exports of 3.8mbbl/d.
    • If the KRG’s exports of 0.55mbbl/d were sold at the same price, then total revenues would have been $73.6bn vs the Iraq budget plans of $57.5bn or the IMF’s estimate of $61.3bn. This reflects the budgets sensitivity of $1.4n to every $1 change in oil prices.
  • Non-oil revenues of $9.9bn for total revenues of $65.4bn (ex-KRG oil revenues).
  • Expenditures, which excluded the KRG’s share of the budget, were $63.8bn or showing a surplus of $1.6bn.
    • If the KRG’s planned $6.4bn expenditures were to be included, total expenditure would have been $70.2bn vs the planned $82.2bn, which would have resulted in a surplus of $3.4bn.

 

 

Note:  Revenues for 2017, and likely for 2018, benefited from higher than planned oil prices. But, expenditures in 2017, and likely in 2018, were lower than planned. The under execution of the budget expenditure, especially on capital spending, is an ongoing feature of Iraqi governments due to the country’s weak institutional capacity and which possess a risk to the reconstructing effort.

 

Sources for this footnote:

http://www.mof.gov.iq/obs/_layouts/obsServices/DownloadObs.aspx?SourceUrl=%2fobs%2fObsDocuments%2fYear-End+Report+Folder+-+مجلد+تقارير+نهاية+السنة%2fEnd-Year+Report+2017.xlsx

http://www.bayancenter.org/en/2018/03/1461/

(http://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr17251.ashx).

http://www.mof.gov.iq/obs/_layouts/obsServices/DownloadObs.aspx?SourceUrl=%2fobs%2fObsDocuments%2fYear-End+Report+Folder+-+مجلد+تقارير+نهاية+السنة%2fEnd-Year+Report+2017.xlsx

 

 

 

[11] Sources: IMF Iraq Country Report No. 17/251, IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) April 2018 database, IMF Regional Economic Outlook (REO) statistical appendix, Iraqi Ministry of Finance (MoF).

Assumptions:

  • Updated figures for 2017 are from MoF which show revenues and expenditures for 2017 excluding those for the KRG. However, MoF and IMF estimates and planed budget include those of the KRG (see details in footnote 9).
  • Iraqi oil price averaged $63.5 for Jan-Jun, while Jun’s average was $69.9. The YTD average is used as an estimate for the full year.
  • Total updated revenues for 2018 & 2019 include higher non-oil revenues as the IMF in May’s REO increased its growth rate for non-oil GDP to +4.4%/+5% for 2018/2019 up from 2.4%/3.7%
  • Revenues are estimates based on updated oil price assumptions while expenditures are the updated IMF’s estimates.
  • Updated Expenditures reflect expectations that the government will ease back on its tight fiscal consolidation, however, they might very well be off-set by the historic tendency for lower budget executions.

 

[12] The IMF (Country Report No. 17/251 P: 28) notes “The program is fully financed through the next twelve months, but there is a financing gap of $7.1bn in late 2018 and 2019. The authorities have contacted one donor to fill the 2018–19 financing gap, for which there is good prospect”. The financing gap is made up of $5bn and $2.1bn respectively 2018 & 2019. Which implies that Iraq has achieved full financing for 2017’s $9.8bn deficit, $4.5bn out of 2018’s $9.5bn deficit., and $1.3bn out of 2019’s $3.4bn deficit.

 

Since the actual budget achieved a surplus for 2017 and would likely achieve a surplus in 2018, then Iraq has borrowed $14.3bn ($9.8bn + $4.5bn see above) to fund a deficit that did not materialize and so the funds could either not be drawn which would lower overall debit or used to fund reconstruction projects.

 

However, it should be noted that “fully financed” does not imply that the all of the funds were delivered to Iraq but that funding agreements were made.

 

[13] https://uk.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-iraq-reconstruction/factbox-pledges-made-for-iraqs-reconstruction-in-kuwait-idUKL8N1Q55RY

 

[14] This would be about 8.4% of 2019’s updated GDP estimate, but as it would be spent on reconstruction it would be a stimulus of about 14.5% of non-oil GDP. It would have an added significance in that the planned for deficits would have been accompanied by restricted capital spending and continued fiscal consolidation by the government, the reversal of which alone would have expansionary effects.

 

[15] The major shortcoming of the successive governments since 2003, was to use most of the oil revenues on expanding the public payroll and social security spending as main vehicle for transfer of oil wealth. As a result very little of oil revenues went towards reconstructing and building the country’s physical capital that would contribute towards diversification away from oil and to economic sustainability. The upshot is high oil dependence with the resultant vulnerability to external forces, import dependence, weak/small private sector and a skewed labor market.

 

Without a fundamental change of track, such as that agreed by the IMF’s 2016 SBA, the fruits of the country’s expanding energy production profile as a result will perpetuate this process. However, this is unsustainable given Iraq’s large rapidly growing population whose needs for public sector jobs cannot be met under any optimistic scenarios for increased oil production or prices.

 

The upshot, is the fundamental change of track along the SBA guidance will take a number of years to unfold, and as such the public-sector payroll and social security spending will continue to account for the bulk of government expenditure and thus the need for accessing the debt markets to fund reconstruction down the road.

 

[16] As can be seen from the author’s report on Iraq’s debt (link on next footnote) that Iraq’s only debt on truly commercial terms are two Eurobonds worth $3.7bn: A $2.7bn bond issued in 2006, due in 2028 with a 5.8% interest rate; and a $1.0bn bond issued in 2017, due in 2023 with a 6.5% interest rate. However, the third $1bn bond issued in 2017, due in 2022, is guaranteed 100% by the U.S. government, with a 2.1% interest rate, and as such does not constitute debt on commercial terms.

 

Therefore, should Iraq access the commercial debt markets these would require fiscal discipline to assure the markets that debt would be serviced. Some of the requirements would take into account, debt repayments as a percentage of exports, currency stability and the level of foreign reserves in relations to months of imports, balance of payments, budget balance as a percentage of GDP. They would also take into account other liabilities and contingent liabilities such as the state guarantees discussed in footnote #22 below. All of these requirements will affect the amount of debt raised and the interest rate it would carry, which would place a much-needed significant fiscal discipline on the government. Coupled with the huge demands for reconstruction they should help ensure that Iraq’s governments pursue sound fiscal policies while following sustainable macroeconomic stability.

 

[17] Link to be provided in an updated version of this report.

 

[18] Updated figures in REO show that the updated figure for 2017 is $114.6bn of which foreign debt is $68bn. However, the older assumptions of 2017 are used as they are part of longer term projections, and crucially they served as the basis for Iraq securing finding for the expected deficits as explained in an earlier footnote.

 

[19] The IMF notes: “These arrears can be tolerated under the Fund’s policy on Arrears to Official Bilateral Creditors because the Paris Club Agreement was found to be adequately representative (i.e., Paris Club creditors provided most of the financing contributions required from official bilateral creditors in the context of that agreement) and the authorities have since been making best efforts to conclude agreements with non-Paris Club creditors on Paris Club comparable terms. Negotiations to implement debt relief on the same terms as with the Paris Club creditors, i.e. an 89.75 percent net present value reduction, are ongoing.”.

 

In the current environment of the rebuilding of the relationship between Iraq and the GCC it is very likely that these negotiations will lead to a grand bargain in which both sides agree to the same 90% debt reduction in exchange for investment opportunities and long-term agreements.

 

[20] $122.9bn less: (1) 90% of $41 or $36.9bn, (2) Unused deficit funding of $14.3

 

[21] The IMF’s updated GDP figures for 2017/2018 are $197.76bn/ $223.3 and GDP/Debt ratios of 58%/54.4%

 

[22] It should be noted that the government has issued 11 state guarantees that affect the total amount of debt that it can take as these are contingent liabilities. These are a total of $36bn made of which the largest is $32.4bn in guarantees of service payments to independent power producers (IPPs) in the electricity sector for the 14 years of the contacts.  This makes it essential for the government to continue with the electricity sector reform and ensure the collection of tariffs-the failure of which will make the state liable to fulfil its guarantees to the IPP’s which would add to the debt.

 

Separately, the IMF aware of all of the above liabilities, in its presentation in the Kuwait Conference, had argued that Iraq should be able to borrow up to $36bn over the next five-years while its debt to GDP would be around 50% by 2022-23. These were made under lower oil price assumptions, with more fiscal discipline in expenditures, over a longer time frame, but without the benefit of the 90% haircut to the $41bn in debt.

http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2018/02/22/its-not-the-donations-stupid-key-points-from-kuwait-conf/ – _edn4

 

[23] The IMF has attributed reconstruction for increasing its non-oil GDP growth rates to +4.4%/+5% for 2018/2019 up from prior +2.4%/+3.7%.

 

These figures could be higher should the full $88bn in reconstruction spending be embarked upon over the next five years as that would be a stimulus equivalent to about 14% of non-oil GDP in each year over the five-year period. While, it is ambitious to assume that all of that amount would be properly spent, yet even half that amount would create the conditions for self-sustaining economic activity for the non-oil sector.

Please click here to download Ahmed Tabaqchali’s full report in pdf format.

Mr Tabaqchali (@AMTabaqchali) is the CIO of the AFC Iraq Fund, and is an experienced capital markets professional with over 25 years’ experience in US and MENA markets. He is a non-resident Fellow at the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS) at the American University of Iraq-Sulaimani (AUIS). He is a board member of the Credit Bank of Iraq.

His comments, opinions and analyses are personal views and are intended to be for informational purposes and general interest only and should not be construed as individual investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell or hold any fund or security or to adopt any investment strategy. It does not constitute legal or tax or investment advice. The information provided in this material is compiled from sources that are believed to be reliable, but no guarantee is made of its correctness, is rendered as at publication date and may change without notice and it is not intended as a complete analysis of every material fact regarding Iraq, the region, market or investment.

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Rabee Securities Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) market report (week ending: 14th June 2018).

Note: ISX will be closed starting from June 17, 2018 to June 19, 2018 due to the religious holiday of Eid Al-Fitr. The next trading session will be held on Wednesday (June 20, 2018).

Please click here to download a table of listed companies and their associated ticker codes.

The RSISX index ended the week at IQD803 (-0.5%) / $861 (-0.5%) (weekly change) (-1.1% and +3.0% YTD change, respectively). The number of week traded shares was 7.6 bn and the weekly trading volume was IQD4.2bn ($3.5 mn).

ISX Company Announcements

  • The Central Bank of Iraq decided to allow citizens to withdraw cash from the points of sale deployed at the agents of electronic payment companies and traders in the Iraqi market. (CBI)
  • Mosul Bank (BMFI) resumed trading on June 14, 2018 after discussing and approving 2016 annual financial results.
  • International Islamic Bank (BINT) resumed trading on June 10, 2018 after providing its 2016 annual and 6M17 financial results.